As the dust settles on the US Presidential election, Donald Trump is now master of all he surveys in US politics. The Republican Party is beholden to him, and through it he controls the Senate and the House of Representatives. This could enable him to push forward radical changes [1], and the Supreme Court is unlikely to get in the way. How will these changes affect the US and the rest of the world? Is the rest of the world ready for the new administration?
I see the following risks emerging from Trump’s election platform and consider these risks below. These can be broadly split in economic and financial risks (#1 - #7), geopolitical risks (#8 - #11) and climate change. Some, such as tariffs and trade wars, or Ukraine and NATO, may be very important in the short term. Others, such as climate change or higher deficits, may be more important in the longer term.
1. Tariffs and trade wars: a key element of Trump’s election campaign was the promise to impose tariffs of at least 10-20% on all imports, with a 60% minimum tariff on Chinese goods. Ostensibly, this will help balance the US government’s books, reduce trade deficits and bring jobs back to the US.
Trump could probably impose the special tariff on Chinese goods under existing executive authority to address unfair trade competition and, while universal tariffs would require congressional approval, I believe that he would obtain this if he were to seek it. There is bipartisan support for higher tariffs: indeed, a Democratic Senator recently proposed similar tariffs [2].
It is unlikely that other countries would accept this without imposing retaliatory measures. A trade war is likely to arise, which will have a negative impact on global growth [3] [4]. A possible historic precedent would be the US Smoot Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, and the retaliatory tariffs this gave rise to, which exacerbated the Great Depression [5]. At the least, industries dependent on exports to the US such as Scotch whisky [6] and German machinery [7] can expect significant hit to sales and profits. With growth weak in the UK and Europe, the tariffs could push these economies into recession, particularly that of Germany which exported US$160bn of goods to the US in 2023 [7], and where growth is close to zero [8].
2. Clampdown on immigrants: another key plank of Trump’s platform was his promise to deport the 11m or so undocumented migrants in the US. There are considerable legal and logistical difficulties to this [9], but it seems pretty certain that the Trump administration will try to deport as many as possible. However, many parts of the US economy such as construction, agriculture and hospitality are dependent on undocumented migrant labour so large-scale deportations could cause widespread disruption to these sectors [10] and a potential contraction in GDP of over 7% by 2028 [11]. With current unemployment of c.4% close to historic lows [12], less migrant labour is likely to boost the wages of legal US workers, but this is likely to be passed on through higher prices. It may also not be possible to replace migrant labour in some areas such as food production, leading to shortages and further spikes in prices.
3. Higher deficits: notwithstanding the revenues generated by tariffs, President Trump’s plans to extend income tax cuts and cut corporation taxes are likely to add to the current large US Federal government budget deficit. A non-partisan research group, the Penn Wharton Budget Model, has estimated that Trump's policies could increase US Federal government deficits by US$5.8trn over the next 10 years, with deficits reaching 8% of GDP compared to 6% under current projections [13].
Such deficits are unprecedented for the US outside of wars or pandemics. They will spur US growth but add to US government debt which is presently 120% GDP. Currently only Italy, Greece and Japan have higher debt : GDP levels among OECD countries [14].
4. Higher US inflation: an irony of Trump’s election is that he won mostly due to the spike in prices under the Biden administration, but his policies of increasing tariffs and cracking down on immigrant labour are likely to apply upward pressure on prices. Tariffs alone could possibly increase prices by 1.2% – 5.1% [15]. Coupled with high deficit spending, inflation could start to rise again just when the US Federal Reserve was getting it under control.
5. Higher interest rates / T-bond yields: before the election, market expectations were for the US Federal Funds rate to fall from c.5% p.a.at present to c.2% by 2026 [16]. However, an uptick in inflation and stimulus caused by large government deficit spending could well cause the US Federal Reserve to hold off on cutting rates, and possibly increase these. Having being criticised for not raising rates quickly enough to deal with the recent spike in inflation, it will be wary of making the same mistake again. Higher short-term rates would be a boon for savers, but would cause problems for those with variable rate borrowings. It would also be a problem for those countries with currencies linked to the US dollar whose rates would need to follow suit.
Higher inflation would also cause US Treasury Bond (T-bond) investors to seek higher yields, as would the increase in supply of T-bonds to fund deficit spending. Higher T-bond yields may push up government bond yields globally, and may cause particular problems to developing country governments. Higher long-term T-bond yields would also filter through into higher new mortgage rates in the US (which are generally fixed and based on long-term yields). This may dampen demand in the housing market, though disruption to construction due to migrant deportations could offset this.
6. Disruption to US T-bond markets: the combination of higher inflation, interest rates and deficits would create strains in bond markets, and give rise to a number of tail risks:
a. T-bond market convulsion: the sheer volume of T-bond issuance is likely to be more than investors and market makers can handle. Higher Basel capital requirements have made it more difficult for the latter to hold large inventories of T-bonds and smooth out peaks and troughs in supply and demand. In 2019, the T-bond repo market seized up, forcing the Federal Reserve to intervene as repo-rates spiked to over 10% [17]. A year later, the US Federal Reserve warned that the size of the T-bond market “may have outpaced the ability of the private-market infrastructure to kind of support stress of any sort” [18].
While the Trump administration may relax capital requirements making it easier for T-bond market makers, and the Federal Reserve can use QE and other tools to address T-bond sell offs, the challenge of managing the T-bond market has increased significantly as total marketable debt outstanding has increased from US$4.5trn at the start of 2008 to US$16.7trn at the start of 2020 and to US$27.7trn at the end of Q3 2024 [19], which deficits will only increase.
To my mind, it is a question of when, not if, such high levels of borrowing cause T-bond market turmoil, how bad this turmoil will be in terms of rising yields, and how far the Federal Reserve will have to intervene.
b. Threats to US Federal Reserve independence: despite appointing the Chair of the Federal Reserve, Jay Powell, in his first term in office, President Trump then clashed with him for not cutting rates fast enough [20]. This feud is likely to continue into Trump’s next term in office if Powell does not cut rates due to rising inflation. Trump believes he should be able to dictate interest rates, and has claimed he has the power to sack Powell. While this is disputed [21], any attempt by Trump to interfere with rate setting and/or sack its Chair would undermine the independence of the Federal Reserve and with it the credibility of US monetary policy in fighting inflation. Investors would lose confidence, and US T-bond yields would spike up as a result.
c. Chinese sell-off: another adverse scenario which could affect the T-bond market would be a large scale sell off of Chinese sovereign holdings of T-bonds, which currently amount to c.US$750bn [22]. This could be triggered by Chinese dissatisfaction with the US over tariffs, trade restrictions and/or Taiwan. Alternatively, it could be triggered by Chinese fears over assets being frozen as happened to Russian central bank holdings after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. In either case, the T-bond market may be unable to manage such a large volume of bonds being sold on top of primary market issuance to fund deficits.
d. Taxation of T-bonds for overseas investors: another scenario may be where spiralling debt service costs, coupled with dissatisfaction around certain countries keeping their currency low by buying T-bonds (and/or for other reasons), leads to the US imposing withholding tax on the T-bond holdings of these countries. This would cause a wider loss of investor confidence and could be considered a de facto default so hopefully this is an unlikely scenario [23].
e. Financial crisis: the Trump administration has promised to relax some of the requirements imposed on banks after the Global Financial Crisis of 2007/09. While not without cost, these higher capital and liquidity requirements have helped the banking sector to weather the Covid-19 pandemic and other recent crises. There is a risk that in loosening requirements, the US banking system becomes less robust and more vulnerable to future shocks such as T-bond market turmoil, in turn amplifying those shocks.
f. US sovereign debt crisis: a combination of some or all of the above could go beyond a temporary market crisis and lead to a fundamental loss of confidence in US T-bonds, to the extent these may no longer be seen as the global “risk free” benchmark asset. If this “tipping point” is reached, markets would react to continued US deficits in the same way as they reacted to Liz Truss’ ill-fated 2022 UK budget which caused 10-20 standard deviation daily movements in UK Gilts [24]. Addressing the sharp rises in bond yields arising would result would require severe budget cuts to bring US deficits down, pushing the US probably the rest of the world into recession.
7. Driving down the dollar?: the election of President Trump has boosted the US dollar on expectations of higher interest rates. However, both Trump and his Vice President, J.D. Vance, are sceptical of the benefits of a strong dollar [25] and may take action to push to push this down to boost exports. They may seek a multilateral agreement to push down the dollar like the 1985 Plaza Accord [26].
However, I believe this is unlikely to succeed, partly due to antipathy caused by higher tariffs, and partly because other countries would be unable to follow US interest rate rises to combat inflation without crippling their own economies. This in turn could prompt Trump to levy higher tariffs.
8. Ukraine and NATO: Trump successfully exploited the antipathy of US voters towards sending military aid to Ukraine in the election [27] and I expect he will follow up by cutting this aid. More worryingly, he may impose a peace deal on Ukraine to bring the war to an end. Such a deal would likely involve Ukraine ceding Crimea, most of the Donbas region, the Azov Sea coast and the other parts of Zaporizia and Kherson Oblasts that Russia has already conquered. If Ukraine is lucky, the rest of it may be admitted into NATO and/or apply to join the EU.
To my mind, there would be many parallels between such a forced peace deal and the ill-fated Munich Agreement of September 1938 which saw Hitler take the Sudetenland from Czechoslovakia with the acquiescence of France and Great Britain. Neville Chamberlain’s claim of “peace in our time” turned out to be hollow when Hitler subsequently conquered the rest of Czechoslovakia six months later, and invaded Poland six months after that, triggering WWII.
By a similar token, Putin may conclude that a peace deal which gave Russia a large part of Ukraine as a vindication of his decision to invade, and that the West doesn’t have the “stomach” for a protracted conflict. He may be encouraged by Trump and his entourage casting aspersions on the US’ NATO allies [28]. While Russia’s armed forces have taken a battering in invading in Ukraine, after time to refit, Putin may be tempted to resume his invasion of Ukraine, or worse attack the Baltic states which NATO is obliged to defend [29]. To my mind, the risk of an all-out war between Russia and NATO is non-trivial and has grown with the election of Trump.
9. China: China is already struggling to meet its 5% p.a. GDP growth target due to demographic headwinds; indebted local authorities; and a property market crisis. The 60% tariffs proposed by Trump could halve exports to the US and reduce growth by 1% GDP [30]. Damage to economic confidence could exacerbate this hit.
I cannot see China taking this lying down and expect it to retaliate with higher tariffs on US goods. In particular, US farmers in Republican states may suffer from higher tariffs on their produce. Other options in which the Chinese can retaliate include:
a. Crackdown on Tesla: while Elon Musk’s high-profile association with Trump has boosted Tesla post-election, this could become problematic given Tesla’s dependence on China. More than half of Tesla’s sales come from its factory in Shanghai [31] and Chinese companies supply nearly 40% of its battery components [32]. Chinese authorities could target this reliance to put pressure on Musk and Trump.
b. Restrictions on sales of rare earths: China accounts for c.90% of the supply of rare earth elements such as Neodymium [33] which are critical to a wide range of products from computer hard drives to wind turbines. China could starve the US of these critical materials in retaliation for higher tariffs. There are precedents for such a ban: in 2010 it banned rare earth exports to Japan for two months after a territorial dispute [34] while last year it retaliated against US chip export restrictions to China by imposing curbs on the export of Germanium which is critical to chip manufacture [35].
c. Sales of US assets: as mentioned above, it could seek to punish the US by dumping holdings of US T-bonds, disrupting the T-bond market and pushing up long-term yields and mortgage rates. This could be counterproductive however if it pushes down the US dollar making Chinese exports less competitive.
10. Taiwan: – one area where the new administration could clash with China in the near future is Taiwan, where Trump has given mixed messages. On the one hand, he has said Taiwan shouldn’t expect the same support from him, and that it should spend more on defence [36]. However, his appointee for National Security Adviser, Mike Waltz, is a noted hawk when it comes to confronting China. It is likely that Trump is “shaking down” Taiwan so it spends more on US military equipment [37], but this in itself would be provocative to China.
One potential flashpoint between China, Taiwan and the US would be the islands of Kinmen (Quemoy) and Matsu which belong to Taiwan but lie just off the coast of China. Chinese forces are already encroaching regularly into Taiwanese waters around Kinmen, and this could escalate into a blockade which either forces Taiwan to cede these islands or risk a wider conflict which could test Trump’s resolve to defend Taiwan [38].
11. Middle East: in his first term in office, President Trump was hawkish against Iran, pulling the US out of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) to deal with Iran’s nuclear ambitions. However, when Iran shot down a US drone in 2019, he ended up pulling back from military retaliation [39], in keeping with his desire not to get the US involved in foreign conflicts.
The other aspect of his Middle Eastern policy was, and is, his wholehearted support for Israel. His election was warmly greeted in Israel, particularly for those who seek to build settlements in the West Bank [40]. This support carries a number of risks.
Firstly, assuming Trump’s support, the Israelis could seek to annex the West Bank [41]. This could be a disaster for Israel in terms of its international standing. It would kill off the ideal of a “two state” solution under the Oslo Accords. More importantly, if it did not give the 2.3m Palestinian Arabs Israeli citizenship, it could end up a pariah state like Apartheid South Africa.
Another risk is if Israel feels emboldened by Trump’s election to go after Iran’s nuclear and oil facilities, having been deterred from doing so by the Biden administration. The former may require US support, particularly in relation to “bunker buster” munitions, and could lead to retaliatory attacks on US targets in the Middle East, dragging Trump into a wider conflict he has sought to avoid. The latter would push up oil prices, particularly if Iran retaliates by disrupting oil shipments through the Straits of Hormuz [42].
12. Climate change: Perhaps the biggest long-term threat from the Trump Presidency will be its impact on climate change. Trump is likely to withdraw the US from the Paris Agreement (again), and has promised to boost oil and gas exploration on US Federal land.
However, US oil and gas exploration had already increased significantly under the Biden administration due to high oil and gas prices after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The scope for further increases may be limited, particularly if oil prices remain low. While Trump has also vowed to scrap the Inflation Reduction Act and its green subsidies, some 80% of US$130bn of investment this has triggered is going into Republican districts, so there will be powerful vested interests on both sides of congress which could frustrate Trump in this regard [43].
Ultimately, however, the absence of the US from the heart of talks on controlling greenhouse gases (GHG) for the next four years is likely to embolden politicians from other countries who are reluctant to face the costs the costs involved, and gives them an excuse for inaction. It makes it more likely that the world will not do enough to limit GHG emissions and that temperatures will rise above the 2% target threshold relative to pre-industrial levels.
Now I accept I may be too focused on the downsides of Trump’s agenda. Certainly the “sugar rush” of higher deficits will propel the US economy forward, as may measures such as making it easier for oil and gas firms to drill on Federal land. The “lighter touch” approach to regulation promised by Trump and his acolytes could further boost growth, for instance if it encouraged further investment in AI. Efforts by Elon Musk to make the US government more efficient may also boost growth and/or reduce government spending and deficits. The election of Kamala Harris would have posed risks of its own such as higher corporation taxes and anti-trust actions against “big tech” firms which would have had an adverse impact on investment by these. Those risks are now off the table for another four years.
However, I don’t think President Harris would have been as iconoclastic as President Trump promises to be in his second term. From trade to NATO to climate change, Trump’s Presidency promises to upend the existing order. Moreover, I don’t think the leaders of the UK and other countries fully appreciate the potential for disruption posed by Trump 2.0. To my mind, there is an element of an “ostriches sticking their heads in the sand”.
Nowhere is this more obvious than the issue of tariffs. I believe Trump when he says that “the most beautiful word in the dictionary is tariff”, and that his administration will drive through uniform tariffs on all imports including from the UK. Yet there are many in the UK who believe it will be exempt, citing Nigel Farage (or some other deus ex machina) creating a carve out for UK exports. However, an exemption for the UK would be conditional on the UK not levying tariffs on US goods, which would make the UK’s trading relationship with the EU impossible if the latter is driven to apply retaliatory tariffs. Similarly, the de-regulation promised by the Trump administration could lead to US goods falling short of EU standards, and again allowing those goods unfettered access to the UK will compromise trade with the EU. To my mind, anyone thinking the UK won’t be negatively affected by US tariffs is indulging in wishful thinking.
It would also appear that markets are sanguine about the threat posed by massive deficits and trade wars under Trump 2.0. US stockmarkets surged after his election, reflecting his promise of deficit charged growth, tax cuts and de-regulation. However, they do not appear to reflect the downside posed by trade wars which has caused stocks to fall elsewhere. The likelihood of higher deficits, inflation and interest rates have also had a modest impact on bond yields, but 10-year T-bond yields are still only 10-15bps higher than they were before the election [44]. Meanwhile measures of volatility such as VIX and MOVE actually fell: this could be down to their short-term nature, and the removal of risks asssociated with a Harris Presidency, but the tail risks caused by a Trump administration do not seem to be priced in [45].
To conclude, I think Trump 2.0 gives rise to severe geo-political, economic and market risks, and I don’t think the rest of the world is prepared for the drama and chaos that may befall it.
[1] Note, however, that while Republicans have 53 senators as against 47 Democrats and independents, 60 senators may be required to avoid a filibuster blocking legislation. Also, some Republican senators opposed Donald Trump in the 2024 election (List of Republicans who opposed the Donald Trump 2024 presidential campaign - Wikipedia) and may vote against his administration’s proposals, for instance on tariffs.
Similarly, in the House of Representatives, the Republicans have only 220 seats against 218 required for a majority, and again some Republican representatives opposed Trump in the 2024 election.
[2] “How America learned to love tariffs”, Economist, 10th October 2024.
[3] “Trump's tariffs would reorder trade flows, raise costs, draw retaliation”, David Lawder, Reuters, 4th November 2023 at Trump's tariffs would reorder trade flows, raise costs, draw retaliation | Reuters
[4] “America v the world”, Economist, 16th November 2024 – inter alia, this cited a Goldman Sachs estimate that Trump’s tariffs could reduce EU GDP by 0.5%, with Germany hardest hit.
[5] Smoot–Hawley Tariff Act - Wikipedia – though it should be noted that when this was imposed, the US had a significant trade surplus with the rest of the world, as opposed to a deficit.
[6] While exports to the US have been declining in recent years, it is still the largest single market by value, with exports of just under £1bn in 2023 compared with total exports of £5.6bn – see “Resilient Scotsh Whisky industry reaches £5.6bn global exports despite ‘challenging’ 2023”, Scottish Whisky Association, 15th February 2024, available at Scotch Whisky Exports 2023 | Scotch Whisky Association
[7] Germany exported US$160bn of goods to the US in 2023, with 14% of German machinery exports going to the US – source: “Return of the Wundertute”, Economist, 16th November 2024.
[8] The European Commission has forecasted a slight decline (-0.1%) in Germany’s GDP in 2024 and growth of only 0.7% in 2025 – see Economic forecast for Germany - European Commission, 15th November 2024.
[9] “Donald Trump’s dream of mass deportations is a fantasy”, Economist, 29th August 2024.
[10] For an illustration of potential economic impacts, see “Trump’s mass deportation plan would be ‘economic disaster’ for US”, Edward Helmore, The Guardian, 30th October 2024 – see Trump’s mass deportation plan would be ‘economic disaster’ for US | US immigration | The Guardian
[11] The Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE) has estimated that in a scenario where 8.3m undocumented workers are deported, real GDP would be 7.4% below their baseline projection by 2028 – see “Trump’s deportation plans would cause lower US employment and GDP than otherwise”, Warwick J. McKibbin (PIIE; Australian National University), Megan Hogan (Former PIIE) and Marcus Noland (PIIE), 4th October 2024 at Trump’s deportation plans would cause lower US employment and GDP than otherwise | PIIE
[12] 4.1% at October 2024 – source: US Bureau of Labour Statistics: Civilian unemployment rate
[13] “Trump v Harris: America has a huge deficit. Which candidate would make it worse?”, Economist, 5th September 2024.
[14] Based on 2022 OECD comparison – see General government debt | OECD. As at Q2 2024, the US debt : GDP ratio was 120% - see U.S. Office of Management and Budget and Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Federal Debt: Total Public Debt as Percent of Gross Domestic Product [GFDEGDQ188S], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; Federal Debt: Total Public Debt as Percent of Gross Domestic Product (GFDEGDQ188S) | FRED | St. Louis Fed, November 22, 2024.
[15] “Fiscal, Macroeconomic, and Price Estimates of Tariffs Under Both Non-Retaliation and Retaliation Scenarios”, The Budget Lab (Yale), 16th October 2024 – see https://budgetlab.yale.edu/sites/default/files/2024-10/The%20Budget%20Lab%20Tariffs%20Analysis%202024_0.pdf
[16] “How Much Will the Fed Cut Interest Rates?”, Preston Caldwell, Morningstar, 19th September 2024 – see How Much Will the Fed Cut Interest Rates? | Morningstar
[17] September 2019 events in the U.S. repo market - Wikipedia
[18] “Why the bond market might keep America’s next president awake at night”, Economist, 4th November 2020.
[19] Total marketable component of total public debt outstanding figures (including intra-governmental holdings) sourced from U.S. Treasury Monthly Statement of the Public Debt (MSPD) figures – see Monthly Statement of the Public Debt (MSPD) | U.S. Treasury Fiscal Data.
[20] “'No guts, no vision!' Trump unhappy after Fed announces modest rate cut”, Edward Helmore, The Guardian, 18th September 2019 – see https://www.theguardian.com/business/2019/sep/18/federal-reserve-interest-rates-trump-jerome-powell
[21] “Trump has threatened to fire the chair of the US Federal Reserve. That could be bad news for inflation”, Henry Maher, the Conversation, 8th November 2024 - see Trump has threatened to fire the chair of the US Federal Reserve. That could be bad news for inflation
[22] As at August 2024 – see China Holdings of US Treasury Securities | Economic Indicators | CEIC
[23] Though the US Trade Representative during the first Trump administration, Robert Lighthizer, has previously mooted a “market access charge” on foreign holdings of US assets as a means for bringing the US dollar down – see “Lighthizer in The Economist: If Trade Deficit Persists Like This, U.S. Will ‘Bleed to Death’ - Coalition For A Prosperous America" - Kenneth Rapoza, Coalition for a Prosperous America (CPA) website, 10th August 2021.
[24] “White Swans and the Moron Risk Premium”, Patrick Kelliher article for Longevitas, December 2022 – see White Swans and the Moron Risk Premium | Longevitas
[25] In 2023, Vance challenged the Federal Reserve chairman on whether a strong dollar had contributed to US industrial decline – see “ICYMI: SENATOR VANCE QUESTIONS CHAIRMAN POWELL ON THE U.S. DOLLAR’S RESERVE CURRENCY STATUS - J.D. Vance”, Press Release, 8th March 2023.
[26] See Plaza Accord - Wikipedia
[27] Notwithstanding the fact that a large part of the money allocated in spent buying arms from US companies; and that total aid to Ukraine (US$106bn up to September 2024 – see How Much U.S. Aid Is Going to Ukraine? | Council on Foreign Relations) is a fraction of the US’ annual defence spending (US$842bn in 2024 – see Department of Defense Releases the President's Fiscal Year 2024 Defense Budget > U.S. Department of Defense > Release
[28] See for example example JD Vance says US could drop support for NATO if Europe tries to regulate Elon Musk’s platforms | The Independent, 17th September 2024.
[29] This could take the form of a strike north from Belarus through the Suwalki gap towards Kaliningrad, cutting the Baltic states off from Poland – see Suwałki Gap - Wikipedia.
[30] “America v the world”, Economist, 16th November 2024
[31] “Tesla’s China deliveries account for more than half of global sales”, Laura He, CNN, 5th July 2023 – see Tesla’s China deliveries account for more than half of global sales | CNN Business
[32] “Tesla's Reliance on Chinese Companies Puts It at Risk of Supply Chain Disruptions”, SupplyChainBrain, 14th August 2023 – see Chinese Companies Make Up Almost 40% of Tesla’s Battery Material Suppliers | SupplyChainBrain.
[33] “Dig, baby, dig”, Economist, 2nd November 2024.
[34] China resumes rare earth exports to Japan - BBC News, 24th November 2010
[35] “China hits back in the chip war, imposing export curbs on crucial raw materials”, Hanna Ziady and Xiaofei Xu, CNN, 3rd July, 2023 – see China hits back in the chip war, imposing export curbs on crucial raw materials | CNN Business. It followed this up in December 2023 with a ban on the export of technology to process rare earths – see “China bans export of rare earths processing tech over national security”, Siyi Liu and Dominique Patton, Reuters, 22nd December, 2023 - China bans export of rare earths processing tech over national security | Reuters
[36] “What a Trump Re-election Would Mean for Taiwan”, Claus Soong, The Diplomat, 1st November 2024 – see What a Trump Re-election Would Mean for Taiwan – The Diplomat
[37] He may also be pressuring Taiwan’s chip makers such as TSMC to invest further in US chip-making, though the US and other developed countries would likely still rely heavily on chips made in Taiwan.
[38] “Exploring a PRC Short-of-War Coercion Campaign to Seize Taiwan’s Kinmen Islands and Possible Responses”, Matthew Sperzel and Daniel Shats of the Institute for the Study of War; Alexis Turek of the American Enterprise Institute, 14th August 2024 – see Exploring a PRC Short-of-War Coercion Campaign to Seize Taiwan’s Kinmen Islands and Possible Responses | Institute for the Study of War
[39] 2019 Iranian shoot-down of American drone - Wikipedia
[40] “Israel's West Bank settlers hope Trump's return will pave the way for major settlement expansion”, Tia Goldenberg, Independent, 13th November 2024 - see Israel's West Bank settlers hope Trump's return will pave the way for major settlement expansion | The Independent
[41] “Two settlement leaders, Ben Gvir call to annex West Bank after Trump victory”, Jeremy Sharon, The Times of Israel, 6th November 2024 – see Two settlement leaders, Ben Gvir call to annex West Bank after Trump victory | The Times of Israel
[42] Disclosure: I have an investment in an oil and gas ETF as a hedge against such a geo-political risk.
[43] “The brown revolution”, Economist, 16th November 2024.
[44] Based on par yield curves produced by the US Treasury, 10-year T-bond yields have risen from 4.31% p.a. on the 4th November and 4.26% on the 5th November to 4.42% on 18th November 2024 – see Resource Center | U.S. Department of the Treasury
[45] “Risk Off: Why financial markets are so oddly calm”, Buttonwood column, Economist 16th November 2024.
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