Six months ago, I published a blog [1] highlighting some of the risks which may arise on Donald Trump’s accession to power in January. A lot has happened since then. Comparing the risks identified with what has occurred…
1. Tariffs and trade wars - I noted Trump's election promise to levy tariffs of 10-20%, with higher tariffs on China, and that this could raise prices and reduce global growth. Sure enough, on 2nd April, which he styled “Liberation Day”, Trump imposed a minimum 10% tariff with higher rates for those with large trade surpluses with the US [2]. These were much higher than many had feared, with the effective tariff on imports coming into the US rising from 2% in 2024 to an average of 24% [3].
Back in November, I worried that markets were not pricing in the risks posed by Trump and his tariff plans. This appears to have been borne out with stockmarkets falling sharply after “Liberation Day” as investors realised that Trump was serious about imposing tariffs, and that this was going to affect the real economy. The S&P 500 fell by over 10% in the following days and the VIX “fear” index of stockmarket volatility rose sharply [4]. By the 9th April, with the chaos spreading to bond markets (see below), Trump paused many of the tariffs for 90 days which calmed markets down. The S&P 500 has since recovered though it is still slightly down from its post-election high.
Trump continued a stand-off with China which led to escalating tariffs and ultimately a de facto US embargo on Chinese imports with a 125% tariff rate. However, on 12th May, faced with the prospect of empty shelves in shops, Trump backed down and reduced the tariff on Chinese goods to 30%.
At the time of writing, a US court has just blocked most of Trump’s tariffs, ruling that the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) he used to impose these did not give him the authority to do so. The administration says it will appeal, and even if it is unsuccessful, Trump could still use the Republican majority in Congress to reimpose tariffs through other legal means, though this could take some time [5].
All of this drama has given rise to significant uncertainty which will depress investment globally, exacerbating any fall in economic growth due to tariffs. Even after the 9th April reprieve, the IMF downgraded the outlook for economic growth due to the impact of tariffs and uncertainty [6]. US consumer confidence has fallen sharply, though it did recover partially in May [7]. Similarly, while assessments of recession risk have fallen back, it is still significant [8]. It remains to be seen whether the recent court ruling on tariffs allays fears and encourages investment to proceed, or whether uncertainty over tariffs continues to act as a drag on the economy.
2. Clampdown on immigrants - I wrote of the threat of mass deportations of immigrants and the impact it would have on US labour markets. So far, there has been little increase, in part because border crossings from Mexico are down. However, Republicans have proposed huge increases in the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) budget to fund new detention centres, technology and more agents, so I would expect deportations to pick up sharply in the coming months and years.
Expect also to hear about the Posse Comitatus Act which bars the US armed forces from law enforcement. There are indications that Trump wishes to override this and deploy troops to the border to help ICE.
3. Higher deficits - I wrote that Trump's plans for tax cuts could increase US Federal government deficits by up to US$5.8trn over the next 10 years. I think this is coming to pass with the most recent budget proposals from the House of Representatives, which the bipartisan Committee for a Responsible Budget has estimated would add US$3.1trn to debt over the next decade [9]. This is after cuts to Medicaid which could lead to 8.6m fewer Americans covered by 2034 [10].
4. Higher inflation - so far in 2025, US inflation has fallen from 3.0% in January to 23% in April [11]. However, it is too early to tell what the impact of “Liberation Day” tariffs announced on the 2nd April will be.
5. Higher Interest Rates and T-bond yields – so far, US base rates have been unchanged since December, and some expect rates to be unchanged this year [12]. However, this needs to be seen in the context of prior expectations of cuts to US rates. The Federal Reserve appears reluctant to cut rates given the potential for inflation to rise with tariffs, though is also wary about falling economic growth.
As for US Treasury Bond (T-bond) yields, 10-year yields had spiked at around 4.8% p.a. just before Trump’s inauguration in January, driven by market expectations of higher economic growth and inflation. They then then fell back to near 4% at the start of April as concerns over US economic grew, before spiking after the bond market turmoil triggered by Trump’s “Liberation Day” tariffs announcements. They are currently sitting at around 4.5% p.a. [13].
6. Disruption to US T-bond markets – I wrote in my blog of the potential for disruption to US T-bond markets. This crystallised sooner than I had expected on the 8th / 9th April, with 10-year yields rising by c.50bps, and with the spread of T-bond yields over 10-year swaps reaching a record 60bps. They then fell back as Trump postponed his “Liberation Day” tariffs for 90 days.
In part this spike in yields as down to falling equity and other markets triggered by the Liberation Day” tariffs, which led to margin calls and forced sales of T-bonds to meet these. Other factors at play were the unwinding of “basis trades” between US T-bonds and futures on these, as well as market makers being unable to cope with the volume of T-bonds being sold [14].
Looking forward, while the T-bond market has stabilised, the events of 8th / 9th April have highlighted how fragile it is, and there is potential for further disruption and bond yield spikes. Of particular concern are Trump’s attacks on the Federal Reserve Chairman, Jerome Powell, for not cutting rates, coupled with hints that he may seek to sack him. While Trump appears to have rolled back on these threats, any threat to the independence of the Federal Reserve could have serious consequences for the “risk free” status of US T-bonds, particularly with the need to re-finance US$9trn over the coming year as well as continued deficits [15].
As I noted in my November blog, US T-bonds could also be compromised by a tax on overseas investors. Around the time I wrote the blog, the current Chairman of the White House’s Council of Economic Advisers, Dr. Stephen Miran, produced a paper on how to address global economic imbalances and persistent US dollar overvaluation. Amongst other things, he proposed a “user fee” for overseas holders of US T-bonds [16]. Such a fee could also call into question how safe US T-bonds are, driving overseas investors away and pushing up yields.
7. Driving down the dollar – in my blog, I speculated about how the Trump administration may seek a new Plaza Accord like that in 1985 to depreciate the dollar against other major currencies. This has not come to pass so far, but whether by accident or design, the dollar has fallen by over 9% against other major currencies since mid-January [17]. In part this may be because the US trade deficit actually widened in Q1, 2025, perhaps because firms stocked up in anticipation of tariffs [18].
There are other trends at play. Even before Trump’s re-election, central banks were reducing holdings of US dollars, and this trend may accelerate, adding to downward pressure on the dollar. Institutional investors such as life insurers and pension funds, particularly in Asia, have been a major source of demand for US dollar assets, but that could reverse, reducing demand for T-bonds and other US dollar assets and pushing up yields as well as depressing the dollar [17].
8. Ukraine and NATO – I wrote in November how Trump may cut off aid to Ukraine and possibly impose a peace deal. Sure enough, the Trump administration not only cut off military aid to Ukraine but also satellite and other intelligence. This led to the Ukrainian incursion into the Kursk region being routed. There was also the unedifying spectacle of Trump and Vance bullying Zelensky in the White House. Along with US overtures to Russia, it seemed like Trump was looking to impose a peace deal on Ukraine that would involve the loss of Crimea, the Donbas and regions in between [19].
The Ukrainians have since placated Trump with an agreement to jointly develop their natural resources [20]. Britain, France and other European countries have also stepped in to fill the gap left by the loss of US aid. Whether this will be enough for Ukraine to prevail in the coming months and years remains to be seen.
If Ukraine falters, and Russia wins with a peace deal to its liking, there is a risk that Putin may be tempted to engage in further aggression. The Russian army would need a period to recover to recover from its losses in Ukraine, but this might only take a few years. A major concern would be a move against the Baltic states but it could also move against other territory such as Norwegian-controlled Svalbard. Such moves could bring Russia into direct conflict with NATO, but Russia may judge that the US and others would not honour their treaty obligations to come to the defence of a member [21]. The contempt expressed by Vance and other senior officials to Europe in the recent leaked Signal chat over air strikes in Yemen may encourage this view [22]. Such has been the doubt cast over US commitment to NATO that the UK and EU have committed to significantly increase defence spending. This will strain already stretched government budgets [23], though the EU ReArm Europe Plan / Readiness 2030 programme will help [24], while higher defence spending will be a boon to European economies sorely pressed by the threat of US tariffs.
9. China – I wrote in November that China would not take higher US tariffs lying down, and that it could retaliate by putting pressure on Tesla and/or restricting is exports of critical rare earths and other minerals to the US. While Tesla seems to escaped China’s ire so far [25], when the US imposed a 10% tariff on China at the start of Trump’s presidency, Beijing imposed restrictions on key 5 key metals including tungsten and molybdenum [26]. This will increase the cost of these for US manufacturers and could have a serious impact on defence industries.
As noted, when the US imposed further tariffs on the 2nd April, China responded with matching tariffs of its own. Eventually the US backed down and reduced tariffs down to 30%. China seems to have successfully stood up to Trump’s bullying, but it has come at a significant cost to its economy.
10. Taiwan – thankfully, the escalation of Chinese pressure on Taiwan I wrote about in November has not come to pass (yet!), but Taiwan is in a precarious position. In 2024, its trade surplus with the US of US$74bn was the sixth largest, ahead of Japan, South Korea and Canada [27]. This has drawn the ire of Trump who threatened it with a 32% tariff on the 2nd April. Taiwan has sought to alleviate this by offering to buy more US good and encourage further investment in the US [28], but needs to keep the President onside given that Trump has previously questioned US support for Taiwan.
11. Middle East – I have been pleasantly surprised by Trump’s efforts to reach out to Iran to see if a deal can be made over their nuclear programme, despite the protestations of Netanyahu. However, there is no guarantee this will come to fruition. Given that the time taken for Iran to enrich its uranium to the weapons grade needed for a nuclear bond is now weeks if not days, if an agreement cannot be reached, then it is likely that Israel and/or the US will strike Iranian nuclear facilities in the latter half of the year [29]. As I wrote in November, Iranian retaliation could include the effective closure of the Straits of Hormuz which would lead to an oil price shock.
Another positive initiative by Trump was his initial push for a truce in Gaza. Unfortunately, that broke down because of the need for Netanyahu to satisfy right-wing coalition partners. Worse, with the indifference if not the support of the US administration, Israel has since starved the population of Gaza and appears to be clearing the way for the ethnic cleansing of the northern part of the strip. These are war crimes [30], and will cause long term damage to the standing of Israel.
12. Climate change – as expected, Trump pulled the US out of Paris Accord, and is seeking to gut the renewable energy subsidies of Joe Biden’s Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) as part of the current budget [31]. However, his exhortation to “drill baby, drill” may fall flat. Fears of recession and lower demand, coupled with increases in OPEC production, have pushed the price of oil to US$60, below the break-even price for most US shale oil drillers (which has risen because of Trump’s tariffs on imported equipment). Many are cutting back on their drilling [32]. Meanwhile renewable energy investment will continue even without IRA subsidies, as unsubsidised renewable energy is often as cheap if not cheaper than fossil fuels [31].
However, the biggest impact of Trump on climate change may be his example. Climate change sceptics have existed for as long as there has been climate science, particularly on the right. Germany’s AfD for instance rejects the notion human-caused climate change [33], while Nigel Farage’s Reform party had made opposition to net zero policies a key plank of its manifestos [34]. Trump’s strident rejection of the “Green New Scam” will give succour to such sceptics and embolden others to join a backlash against climate change policies which may last well after he leaves office.
Overall, I think I was broadly on the money about most risks, but what about the risks I missed? I seriously under-estimated the impact of Trump in the following areas:
13. DOGE chaos – although Elon Musk had a pretty tough reputation as an employer in the private sector, I did not consider the chaos that would ensue from putting him in charge of DOGE. However, in February alone, some 62,000 government employees were sacked [35] by DOGE, leading to layoffs reaching their highest levels since July 2020 [36]. This no doubt contributed to the wider fall off in consumer sentiment in Trump’s first three months in office. While some will have since been re-instated, this will have demoralised civil servants and undermined the operation of government.
Worse, many of those sacked were in critical positions such as National Nuclear Safety Administration [37] whose operations were compromised with potentially disastrous consequences. This is to say nothing of the dubious legality of many of DOGE’s cuts [38], or the worrying attempts by DOGE staff to access sensitive government systems [39].
14. International Aid – one the most odious episodes of Musk’s time in charge of DOGE was his boast to have put USAid into the “wood chipper”. At a stroke, thousands of aid projects helping some of the poorest people in the world were cancelled [40].
Unfortunately, Belgium, France, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom also announced cuts to their overseas aid budgets, in many cases to fund increased defence spending to placate Trump. All told, these amount to cuts of up to US$60 billion in overseas aid. Particularly affected are global health programs with an estimated 18% cut in aid. The US alone provided nearly 2/3rds of funding for programs to tackle HIV which will now be cut by US$2bn or 20% of current funding [41]. Such cuts will no doubt lead to thousands in otherwise avoidable infections and deaths in developing countries.
Such cuts may also come back to haunt donor countries if they lead to the increased spread of communicable diseases worldwide. For instance, funding to fight Tuberculosis will fall 22% to US$1.9bn [41], but this will lead to increased spread of this disease and/or further emergence of antibiotic strains which may lead to costly outbreaks in developed countries. In addition, Trump’s decision to pull the US out of the WHO may limit that organisation’s ability to respond to outbreaks. Such cuts in health programs make it more likely that new diseases like Covid will not be contained but spread. Given the economic impact of Covid, cuts in overseas aid for health may be “penny wise, pound foolish”.
14. Health – it’s not just the health of those in developing countries that Trump has risked, it’s his own people. DOGE managed to sack crucial Department of Agriculture employees trying to deal with the America’s growing bird flu epidemic which has spread to cattle and other animals and infected dozens of people [42]. Cuts to staff at the Centre for Disease Control and Prevention will limits its ability to track the spreads of diseases like HIV and manage new disease outbreaks in the US [43].
Meanwhile, Trump has installed Robert F Kennedy Jr, a noted vaccine sceptic [44], as Secretary of the US Department of Health and Human Services. He is likely to do little about falling vaccination rates with the number of school children without the recommended vaccinations rising from 7% to 18% [45]. This is contributing to the current measles outbreak spreading from Texas, and longer-term could lead to the disease becoming endemic again in the US [46].
16. Education and Science are under attack on two fronts from Trump. First, as part of his “war on woke”, Trump has attacked elite universities such as Harvard and Columbia on the grounds that they are beholden to DEI ideology and plagued by antisemitism. To my mind, this is more to do with fighting culture wars and engaging his MAGA base, but actions such as denying visas to overseas students, taxing endowments and pulling research funding will have severe consequences for US universities and the US as a whole. Harvard is one of the top universities in the world, attracting many of the brightest students to the US. It is an act of self-harm to try cripple such a talent magnet.
The Trump administration is also cutting research funding more generally. It has already cut US$8bn of grant funding, or roughly 1/6th of the Federal funding for higher education research, and in the process cancelled more than 3,000 grants which had already been approved. Going forward Trump is looking to cut Federal research funding by just under US$40bn, or one third of total Federal funding for research. Climate change and vaccine research appears to have been especially targeted. [47] Up to 80,000 researchers could lose their jobs [48]. Less US researchers will filter through in the longer term to less innovation and growth, not just in US but globally.
Such cuts, along with the culture war attacks above, have had a chilling effect on top academic talent, with up to 75% of US researchers thinking of leaving and applications from overseas researchers down 25% [48]. Potentially the US could lose its pre-eminent position in critical areas of science such as AI: nearly two thirds of AI researchers in the US hail from overseas [48]. In coming years, Trump’s ill-judged war on science and education could be seen as a historic mistake that handed key ground to China and Europe in AI and other key technology.
17. International taxation – another area where the Trump administration could come into conflict with other governments is on taxation. Trump pulled the US out of an OECD-led international taxation framework which, amongst other things, sought to impose a 15% minimum corporation tax rate [49]. The framework permitted countries levy “top up” taxes on profits which are taxed in other countries at a rate below 15%. However, Trump has threatened that any country that applied such a “top up” tax on a US company would be hit with retaliatory US taxes. Trump has also made threatening noises about other countries digital services taxes (DSTs) which he views as unfair to US tech giants [50].
These threats are now being embedded in the latest budget bill in section 899 on “unfair foreign taxes”. Where the US deems a country to be levying such taxes, it can apply a surcharge tax of up to 20% on the US dividends, interest and rental income of individuals and firms from that country [51]. No doubt, the Trump administration would seek to use such a cudgel against DSTs and other taxes he dislikes, but this could prompt investor flight from the US, de-stabilising markets.
18. Greenland and Canada – perhaps the most eye-catching of Trump’s early announcements was the demand that Denmark cede Greenland to the US, and for Canada to become the “cherished” 51st state (notwithstanding the fact that such a state would be larger than the rest of the US). Trump’s clumsy approaches have antagonised Denmark, Greenland and Canada.
In Canada, such approaches coupled with tariffs on Canadian goods has led to popular backlash against the US and a consumer boycott of US goods. While Trump may view Canada as a “soft touch” given its relatively modest population and economic reliance on the US, the US is also reliant on Canada in many areas. For instance, electricity grids in many US states rely on Canada’s hydropower to help balance demand surges, and Canada could increase the price paid by US electricity users [52]. The US is also reliant on certain types of crude oil produced by Canada’s tar sands [53].
Anti-Trump sentiment helped propel Mark Carney and his Liberal Party to power in the recent Federal election. However, this has not gone down well in Alberta where the Liberals are viewed as hostile to oil interests. There is a possibility of an independence referendum which could lead to Alberta seceding from the rest of Canada [54].
As for Greenland, Trump’s approach has actually led to a reduction in native Greenlander demands for independence from Denmark, and boosted ties between Greenland and Denmark [55].
19. Crypto-currency – the Trump administration has appointed individuals associated with crypto industry to head the SEC and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. This is leading to a relaxing of crypto-currency regulation. In part this could be down to the Trump family’s extensive interests in crypto-assets, while crypto-firms were also big donors to the Trump campaign.
In any case, lighter regulation could increase conduct risks, for example, of crypto-assets being mis-sold to retail investors. It could also lead to prudential risks to banks and other financial institutions with counterparty exposure to crypto firms (such as Silicon Valley Bank), while a “run” on stablecoins could lead to wider financial market chaos. [56]
I am sure there are other risks out there which I have missed. I think the only thing certain about the Trump administration is the uncertainty caused by a US President with little time for niceties, a jaundiced view of the world and a desire to leave his mark.
I still believe that politicians and markets are under-estimating the impact of Trump and his policies, particularly on the economy. For instance, while stockmarkets have recovered most ground lost on “Liberation Day” and consumer sentiment has partly rebounded, there is still a high risk of recession due to the uncertainty created by Trump and his tariffs. US shares were over-valued on historic measures before Trump was elected, and I believe their current levels are unjustified given what is happening in the wider economy. There are also considerable fragilities in the financial system caused by rising US deficits which could break if Trump attacks the independence of the Federal Reserve and/or undermines the dollar’s “safe haven” status. Finally, in too many areas, from what next on tariffs, to deportations, to Taiwan, it is too early to tell the impact of Trump’s chaos.
[1] "Is the world prepared for Trump 2.0?", 24th November 2024 – see https://www.crystalriskconsulting.co.uk/is-the-world-prepared-for-trump-20-23.html
[2] See Liberation Day tariffs - Wikipedia
[3] “Back to the 19th century”, Economist, 5th April 2024.
[4] The S&P500 went from 5670.97 on 2nd April to 4982.77 on 8th April, while the VIX index went from 21.51 on 2nd April to 52.33 on 8th April.
[5] “Duty Calls”, Economist, 12th April 2025.
[6] World Economic Outlook, April 2025: A Critical Juncture amid Policy Shifts, IMF, April 2025.
[7] “US Consumer Confidence Partially Rebounds in May”, The Confidence Board press release, 27th May 2025 - US Consumer Confidence.
[8] “The probability of a recession has fallen to 40%”, J P Morgan Global Research, 27th May, 2025 – What Is the Probability of a Recession? | J.P. Morgan Research.
[9] "CBO's First Score of House Reconciliation Bill", Committee for a Responsible Budget, 21st May 2025 - https://www.crfb.org/blogs/cbos-first-score-house-reconciliation-bill.
[10] "Working hypotheses", Economist, 17th May 2025.
[11] Based on Bureau of Labor Statistics Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U) measure – see The Economics Daily release of 19th May 2025 at Consumer prices up 2.3 percent from April 2024 to April 2025 : The Economics Daily: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.
The US Federal Reserve’s Personal Consumption Expenditures (PCE) Price Index also fell slightly from 2.6% in January to 2.3% in March – see The Fed - Inflation (PCE).
[12] Fed holds interest rates steady as the central bank weighs impact of Trump tariffs - CBS News by Aimee Picchi, CBS News Moneywatch, 7th May 2025.
[13] Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (US), Market Yield on U.S. Treasury Securities at 10-Year Constant Maturity, Quoted on an Investment Basis [DGS10], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DGS10, 27th May 2025.
30-year yields have shown a similar pattern – see Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (US), Market Yield on U.S. Treasury Securities at 30-Year Constant Maturity, Quoted on an Investment Basis [DGS30], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DGS30.
[14] “Stupidly dangerous”, Economist, 12th April 2025.
[15] “How a dollar crisis would unfold”, Economist leader, 19th April 2025.
[16] “A User’s Guide to Restructuring the Global Trading System”, Dr.Stephen Miran, Hudson Bay Capital, November 2024 - 638199_A_Users_Guide_to_Restructuring_the_Global_Trading_System.pdf
[17] “Check your privilege”, Economist, 19th April 2025.
[18] U.S. International Trade in Goods and Services, March 2025 | U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), U.S. Census Bureau and the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, 6th May 2025.
[19] “Deal or no deal”, Economist, 26th April 2025.
[20] Seven takeaways from Ukraine minerals deal - BBC News, 1st May.
[21] “Briefing – Would Vladimir Putin attack NATO?”, Economist, 10th May 2025.
[22] Inter alia, Vice President Vance commented that "I just hate bailing Europe out again" with Secretary of Defence Pete Hegseth responding "VP: I fully share your loathing of European free-loading. It's PATHETIC”. See United States government group chat leaks - Wikipedia
[23] “The price of security”, Economist, 1st March 2025
[24] “Acting on defence to protect Europeans”, European Commission, March 2025 - Future of European defence - European Commission
[25] Though it could be seriously affected by a Chinese regulatory clampdown on autonomous driving given its drive to develop self-driving taxis – see At China auto show, EV makers to grapple with autonomous-tech crackdown, launch Tesla 'killers' | Reuters, 21st April 2025.
[26] “Xi Jinping swings his ‘assassin’s mace”, Economist, 8th February 2025.
It followed up on the 4th April with restrictions on the export of magnets made with rare earths – see “State of flux”, Economist (Science and Technology section), 10th May 2025.
Disclosure: I am currently invested in an ETF that invests in companies producing rare earths and other strategic metals.
[27] U.S. International Trade in Goods and Services, December and Annual 2024 | U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), U.S. Census Bureau and the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, 5th February 2025.
[28] Taiwan pledges to buy more American goods as a 32% tariff looms | The Independent, Associated Press, 28th May 2025.
[29] “Not now, Bibi”, Economist, 12th April 2025.
[30] Starvation of civilians as a method of warfare is prohibited under Article 54 of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), of 8 June 1977 – see War Crimes under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and their source in International Humanitarian Law
[31] “Reduction redux”, Economist, 24th May 2025.
[32] “Well, well, well”, Economist, 17th May 2025.
[33] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alternative_for_Germany#Environment_and_climate
[34] Nigel Farage’s new party wants climate backlash at center of UK election – POLITICO, Abby Wallace, Politico, April 9th 2024
[35] “Ungilded”, Economist – Schumpeter, 5th April 2025.
[36] “Layoffs across the U.S. soar to highest level since 2020, led by DOGE cuts”, Aimee Picchi, CBS News Moneywatch, 6th March, 2025 – https://www.cbsnews.com/news/layoffs-job-cuts-highest-since-2020-doge-economy-trump/
[37]“Dismissed nuclear bomb specialists recalled by Energy Department”, Ari Natter and Bloomberg, Fortune, 14th February 2025 - DOGE firings: nuclear weapon specialists to be hired back | Fortune
[38] “DeDOGEd”, Economist, 24th May 2025.
[39] For instance, the Bureau of Fiscal Service’s payment system – see “Bureau of worry”, Economist, 15th February 2025.
[40] “Long knives”, Economist, 15th February 2025.
[41] The future of foreign aid: A generational shift | McKinsey, May 2025.
[42] DOGE accidentally fired USDA staff who were working to contain bird flu outbreak | The Independent, 19th February 2025.
[43] See for example “Chilling effects”, Economist, 24th May 2025 for the impact of cuts on CDC and other vital government bodies.
[44] “Here's RFK Jr.'s Record on Anti-Vaccine Views | TIME, 29th January 2025.
[45] “Vax populi”, Economist, 22nd February 2025, which describes how state level anti-vaccine legislative initiatives are contributing to the problem.
[46] “Rash decisions”, Economist, 24th May 2025.
[47] “Looming disaster”, Economist, 24th May 2025.
[48] “Your loss is our loss”, Economist, 24th May 2025.
[49] Trump effectively pulls US out of global corporate tax deal | Reuters, 21st January 2025. Note that the first Trump administration cut the minimum corporation tax rate to 10%.
[50] “Beyond tariffs”, Economist, 1st February 2025.
[51] “After tariffs, a new front”, Economist, 31st May 2025.
[52] “The U.S. buys electricity from Canada - now it's a focus of the trade war”, Joe Hernandez, NPR, 12th March 2025 – Canadian electricity a new focus of the U.S. trade war : NPR
For more detail, see also Map Shows How US and Canada's Energy Grids Connect - Newsweek
[53] Explainer: Why Canadian oil is so important to the United States, Canadian Energy Centre, 30th January 2025.
[54] “Canada’s angry cowboys”, Economist, 31st May 2025.
[55] “Independence blunted”, Economist, 24th May 2025.
[56] “Briefing – Cryptocracy”, Economist, 17th May 2025.
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